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‘FOREIGN POLICY FUSION: LIBERAL INTERVENTIONISTS, 
CONSERVATIVE NATIONALISTS AND NEOCONSERVATIVES, THE NEW 
ALLIANCE DOMINATING THE US FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT’ 
 
Previous research has refuted claims that American neo-conservatives successfully 
hijacked the Bush administration or are ensconced at the heart of the US foreign policy 
Establishment (Parmar, 2008, 2007; Mickelthwait and Wooldridge, 2005; Busby and 
Monten, 2005; Lieber, 2003, at http://Chronicle.com/free/v49/i34/34b01401.htm). There 
was no ‘neo-conservative moment’ in the way that that is normally understood. Building 
on this research, it is increasingly clear that there are several broad tendencies in US 
foreign policy politics that have combined so as to generate the bases of a new foreign 
policy consensus that is set to outlast the Bush administration (Renshon, 2007). Three 
developments in particular have had great impacts on the generation of a new US foreign 
policy consensus: an enormous increase in the influence of conservatism and of 
conservative organisations – such as the Heritage Foundation – during the 1990s; the rise 
of a vociferous sub-component of conservatism from the 1970s – the neo-conservatives; 
and, highly significantly for this article, the development since the late 1980s of a robust, 
crusading and theoretically confident liberal interventionism, built around a belief in the 
efficacy of ‘democratic peace’ and ‘democratic transition’ theory (Smith, 2007). 9-11 
was the crucible for the effective fusion of those three developments, though each 
tendency retained its ‘sphere of action’: broadly, the conservatives dominated the Bush 
administration, the neo-conservatives focused on the media, policy advocacy, and public 
opinion, while the liberal interventionists cemented their ties with leading members of the 
Democratic party. Right and Left appear to have forged an ‘organic ideology’, an 
historically effective ideology of global intervention, an enduring new configuration of 
power that is likely to limit the room for manoeuvre of Democratic President-elect, 
Barack Obama.. This article analyses a key liberal interventionists’ initiative – the wide-
ranging Princeton Project on National Security – that appears to sit at the very heart of 
thinking among centrists, liberal and conservative alike. (Interestingly, this new 
consensus owes more than a little to its apparent nemesis, the neo-conservatives). 
Consequently, this article will also assess the efficacy of the new consensus by exploring 
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the foreign policy positions and advisers of President-elect Obama and of John McCain, 
his main rival. The conclusion drawn is that an Obama victory will not augur any 
significant changes in US foreign policy. 
 
The Rise of Conservative Power  
Although the shift towards liberal interventionism is the ‘big story’, the contribution of 
conservatism/neo-conservatism to that development requires brief retelling. The Heritage 
Foundation’s self-conscious rise to the status of ‘establishment’ think tank is 
fundamental. Heritage President Ed Feulner’s declaration in 1991 that there would be by 
2001 a powerful conservative Establishment that out-muscled the liberals may not fully 
have come to pass, but the US today is a conservative nation (Mickelthwait and 
Wooldridge, 2005).1 Heritage sits at the heart of the Bush administration. Its vital 
statistics – size of budget and expenditure, range of activities, White House connections, 
and so on, place it close to the centres of power. That Heritage’s conservatism is 
inclusive is also clear: the New York neo-conservatives were embraced as the sources of 
new energy and vigour (Meyerson, 1991).2 The Project for a New American Century, 
frequently considered the quintessential neocon vehicle, has been found to be a primarily 
mainstream conservative organisation whose leaders and signatories were mainly Ivy 
League and other elite university educated, east coast born, Protestants. PNAC leaders 
were also, surprisingly, found to be almost equally close to conservative and liberal think 
tanks as they were to ‘neocon’ groupings (Parmar, 2008).  Additionally, several other 
neocon groups – which are in critics’ minds associated with a neocon cabal that allegedly 
drove the US to war on Iraq – such as the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, Defense 
Policy Board, Center for Security Policy, and the Jewish Institute for National Security 
Affairs – have been shown to have been formed either at the behest of the White House 
or received significant Bush administration cooperation for their apparently independent 
public activities and campaigns (Toenjes, ca 2003). Finally, it also the case that, among 
the twenty-four Bush appointees who have been most closely identified as neocons or as 
close to them, there are 27 links with conservative think tanks,19 with their liberal 
counterparts, and  20 with ‘neocon’ think tanks. There are 11 connections with the 
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Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the traditional liberal think tank at the very heart of 
the US foreign policy Establishment (Parmar, 2007).  
 
Liberal Shift 
The last piece of evidence takes us nicely into a neglected aspect of intellectual and 
ideological shifts in foreign policy thinking over the past nearly two decades: the 
development of liberal interventionism or liberal hawkishness favouring democratic 
peace theory-inspired democracy promotion and humanitarian intervention as the way to 
US and global security. Ultimately, it is this development that evidences the growth of 
conservative power, and enhances the power of the conservative foreign policy agenda of 
the Bush administration, making it all the more likely that the post-Bush era will 
similarly be characterised by continued ‘democracy-building’ programmes in, and 
military occupation of, Iraq and the use of democracy-promotion policies, with and 
without force, in regard to the Middle East and other parts of the Third World. A little 
more will be noted on the implications of this for Obama’s White House. 
 
Tony Smith argues that intellectual developments – such as democratic peace and 
transition theories - internal to the concerns of liberal internationalists coinciding with the 
end of Cold War superpower military competition created the conditions for the 
emergence of a globally assertive American internationalism that wanted to put some 
military muscle behind the push for democracy and human rights. Committed to 
multilateralism and international law, liberals redefined the principle of national 
sovereignty in order to permit the international community – or ‘Community of 
Democracies’ – militarily to intervene to prevent humanitarian disasters and to promote 
democracy (Sinclair and Byers, 2007). In effect, Smith argues, liberals’ ‘muscular 
multilateralism’ for global human rights, dovetailed with the conservatives’ and neocons’ 
unilateralism and focus on American preponderance to produce, after 9-11, an effective 
bipartisan consensus around the Bush doctrine (Smith, 2007, pp. 163-194).3 This also led 
many liberals and Democratic party leaders to support the American war on Iraq to defeat 
an undemocratic, brutal dictatorship, albeit one that had been contained for over a decade. 
 
 4 
The Democratic party’s Progressive Policy Institute – often known as Clinton’s think 
tank - is a good example of the political impacts of intellectual shifts among liberal 
internationalists, according to Smith. The PPI counts among its supporters and statement 
signatories liberal hawks such as Robert Kerrey, Larry Diamond, Kenneth Pollack, and 
James Rubin, and Democratic representatives and senators such as Stephen Solarz, 
Joseph Biden, Hillary Clinton, John Kerry and Joseph Lieberman.4 PPI backed the Iraq 
War as part of a new generational war, like the Cold War, that demanded that America 
‘rally the forces of freedom and democracy around the world to defeat this new menace 
and build a better world.’ According to Smith, the PPI’s public statements on Iraq were 
even more militaristic than those of the PNAC. In 2005, the PPI declared that ‘Today’s 
Islamist terrorists could prove more dangerous than our Cold War adversaries…. 
[Therefore], Jihadist extremism will be the Democratic Party’s first priority this year and 
every year until the danger recedes.’ In short, the only points of difference between the 
PPI and allied liberal internationalists and the Bush administration were on the details 
and emphases, not the policies themselves. This ‘terror war liberal interventionism’ is, in 
effect, a twenty-first century variant of ‘Cold War liberalism’, along the lines of Arthur 
Schlesinger’s The Vital Center.5 It may be inferred from this that Obama’s early 
opposition to the Iraq War, in late 2002, was similarly based on tactical, rather than 
principled, factors. 
 
The Princeton Project on National Security (PPNS) constitutes the post-9-11 fusion of 
conservative nationalism, with its focus on US military power, and of liberal 
humanitarian interventionism. Its formation and work signal important components of the 
mindset of the US foreign policy Establishment which now encompasses several ‘neo-
con’ themes but without the neo-cons, apart from the lapsed neo-con, Francis Fukuyama. 
It is to the work and significance of PPNS that attention now turns.6 
 
Princeton Project on National Security 
The Princeton Project on National Security claims to have developed the bases of an 
‘alternative’ national security strategy to that of President George W. Bush as proclaimed 
in the latter’s 2002 National Security Strategy. Although not a ‘blueprint’ for specific 
 5 
policies, the PPNS’ Final Report claims to supply the underlying principles that ought to 
guide future American administrations’ foreign policies and national security strategies. 
Due to its scholarly leadership and credentials, the prominence and policy-related 
experience of its participating individuals and organizations, the Report is likely to be of 
some significance in its potential contribution to the development of a post-Bush 
bipartisan foreign and national security policy.  
 
What is the political-ideological significance of the PPNS’ work and Final Report? It is 
critical of the Bush administration’s policies, and of their ‘neo-conservative’ character – 
militaristic, unilateralist, pre-emptive and too prone to preventative war. However, do the 
PPNS’ working papers and Final Report’s assumptions and proposals differ 
fundamentally from those of the Bush administration? Does the Report represent a 
‘liberal-internationalist’ backlash against the ‘ideological’ Bush doctrine? Does it signify 
the galvanization of a bipartisan bloc that may be destined to steer US foreign policy and 
national security strategy long after the Bush era and into the Obama White House?  
 
This article seeks, by critically analyzing the content of the PPNS’ Final Report (and 
some of the many working groups’ activities that provided the sources of the Report), 
considering the credentials and interlocking organizational backgrounds of the elites who 
led and participated in the Project, and assessing the Project’s sources of funding, to 
come to some conclusions about the character of the PPNS and the significance of its 
Report. Its broad conclusions are that the Princeton Project on National Security is a fine 
example of scholarship in the service of the state (broadly conceived). Its scholarly 
claims of social-scientific rigour and thorough analyses of history (PPNS, 2006)7 are 
compromised by the requirement to produce a document that hopes to secure the support 
of and to guide ‘hard-headed’ policy influentials. Its critical attitude to the Bush 
administration underlines its own relative ‘centrism’ in contrast to the former’s excesses 
and extremism (Hodgson, 1972-3).8 Its more or less completely uncritical overt and 
covert belief in the US as the ‘good’, peace-loving, freedom-promoting, ‘well-
intentioned’ but ‘misunderstood’ or ‘envied’ nation underline the PPNS’ nationalistic-
patriotic intellectual underpinnings. Its underlying liberalism is highlighted by the 
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uncritical claim that ‘American values’ are universally desirable and applicable and, 
therefore, ought to be spread to the rest of the world. The underlying narrative of 
America as ‘victim’ of foreign military and terrorist aggressions – from Pearl Harbor 
1941 to September 11 2001 - as the source of America’s engagement with the world, 
indeed as the source of its desire to be the world’s leader, reflects the self-image of the 
most uncritical and unreflective US foreign policymakers, and ignores evidence – 
scholarly, journalistic and other – to the contrary or even mildly critical. The Report’s 
characterisation of all violent opposition, particularly in the Islamic world, to US foreign 
policy as ‘a global insurgency with a criminal core’ (PPNS, 2006, 9) is further evidence 
of the same and of its sidelining of scholarly research that yields evidence of the 
rationality rather than religiosity of such opposition (Pape, 2003). Even its bi-partisanship 
is called into question by the fact that the only criticism in the Report is directed at one 
party leader, George W. Bush, and his (mainly neo-conservative) allies.  
 
This article broadly endorses a Gramscian perspective within which the PPNS is 
interpreted as a group of organic intellectuals intimately connected – institutionally, 
financially, politically and ideologically – with an American hegemonic project to 
reshape the post-Cold War, post-9-11 world. This project works by embedding American 
values, practices and interests into existing and new international and regional 
organizations, expanding concepts of US security to foreign ports and territories, 
penetrating other societies that constitute probable or possible future threats, increasing 
American military spending in the context of building new international alliances and 
organisations, and making precise and institutionalizing the rules of preventive war and 
military pre-emption. In short, and in their own words, the Princeton Project urges 
America to take the lead in creating a liberal global order protected by a ‘concert of 
democracies’ operating outside the UN system but (apparently) upholding the latter’s 
values (PPNS, 2006, 26). 
 
Of course, the Final Report bears all the hallmarks of a product of the liberal-
internationalist community represented by its leaders, participants and funders. It 
therefore reads as a fairly sober, reasonable, apparently non-ideological analysis and set 
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of proposals. Its constituent Working (study) Groups took over two years to come to their 
conclusions. The document is reasonable enough to critique the idea that there is one 
single threat – such as communism or terrorism - to the United States around which to 
construct a unified framework for national security. The ‘war on terror’ cannot supply the 
rationale to counter global climate change, natural disasters, and pandemics, for example. 
Multiple threats require multiple strategies and tactics. The Report concedes that other 
states and peoples might see things differently than the United States, and that other 
states ought to be consulted before American-led action. It argues against reflex-
unilateralism, and promotes the development of internationally-agreed rules for 
preventive wars. It argues for a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine question; for 
talks with Syria and Iran; for the integration of China into the American-led global order. 
It argues for the greater effectiveness of US power by combining ‘soft power’ with its 
‘hard’ power. It is argued here, however, that the above merely makes the PPNS’ 
proposals more worrying as they are more likely to gain broader political acceptance: 
their very ‘reasonableness’ being more acceptable than the Bush administration’s mixture 
of ‘evangelism’ and ‘ideology’ – especially given the current sense of crisis in the US 
war on Iraq.9 
 
Origins, Aims and Operation of the PPNS 
According to the PPNS’ own rationale, ‘we’ – the United States or the world, it is not 
entirely clear - exist at ‘a moment of critical global transitions’ of such import that the 
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University 
‘launched a major academic initiative to develop a long-term national security strategy 
for the United States of America.’ The aim was to ‘strengthen and update the intellectual 
underpinnings of U.S. national security strategy’ (PPNS, 
Http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/mission.html).  
According to Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, co-director (with G. John Ikenberry) of 
the Project,10 the Princeton Project was based on the work of ‘leading U.S. academics and 
policy makers and informed by consultation with top thinkers around the globe’ and 
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formally launched in May 2004. In attendance, among other notables, was former 
national security adviser and secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. 
Ambitious in its sweep and vision, the Project’s organizers wanted to replicate the work 
and achievements of Princeton’s George F. Kennan, the scholar who headed the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Staff and is renowned as the architect of the anti-
communist ‘containment’ doctrine. As former secretary of state, Colin Powell, noted, 
‘because Kennan could see more deeply, he could predict more accurately’ (PPNS, 2006, 
2). The PPNS was a self-conscious attempt ‘to write a collective ‘X article’’, to replicate 
today Kennan’s (then-anonymous) 1947 Foreign Affairs article that publicly launched the 
doctrine of containment (X.; Kennan, 1947). Of course, the world is now more complex 
than in 1947 and Kennan’s intellectual power was practically unmatchable. Hence, a 
collective endeavour that ultimately involved around 400 scholars, policymakers, former 
officials, businessmen, and other influentials (Lobe, 2006). Nevertheless, the aim of the 
Report was nothing less than to ‘set forth agreed premises or foundational principles to 
guide the development of specific national security strategies by successive 
administrations in coming decades’ (Http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/mission.html). 
(Emphasis added). 
Since May 2004, the Project convened and published 7 Working Groups’ findings on a 
range of national security challenges. The 7 Groups were: grand strategy, state security 
and transnational threats, economics and national security, reconstruction and 
development, anti-Americanism, relative threat assessment, and foreign policy 
infrastructure and global institutions. Seventeen working papers were commissioned ‘on 
critical security topics that hitherto had received scant attention.’ A series of 9 
conferences followed in the US and abroad – including at the Council on Foreign 
Relations, New York, St Anthony’s College (Oxford), Brookings Institution, the 
universities of Texas and Tokyo, and the Truman National Security Project - to solicit 
input on numerous working papers and on the draft strategy (PPNS, 2006, 4). The Project 
culminated in the production and dissemination of a 90-page Final Report on national 
security, Forging a World of Liberty Under Law. Acknowledging that there were 
numerous other ongoing efforts to develop grand strategy for the US, Slaughter claimed 
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that the Project aimed to ‘link these efforts together in a comprehensive fashion’ 
(Http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/welcome.html)11 and ‘to build on overlapping areas of 
consensus in charting America’s future course’ (PPNS, 2006, 2).12 PPNS, therefore, saw 
itself as strategic in elite consensus-building, hoping thereby to exercise wider influence. 
Given that President George W. Bush’s 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategy 
documents did not command broad bipartisan support, the PPNS claims that it is above 
party politics as it is headed by George Schultz, former secretary of state in the Reagan 
administration and close confidant of current secretary of state, Condoleeza Rice, and 
Anthony Lake, former national security adviser to the Clinton administration. Its non-
political character is further suggested by its funding by Mr. David Rubinstein (a leading 
financier with the Carlyle Group), the Ford Foundation, the German Marshall Fund for 
the United States, New America Foundation, and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. It was launched at an event on Capitol Hill sponsored by the New 
America Foundation, presided over by the Republican realist, Senator Charles (Chuck) 
Hagel, and Democratic internationalist, Senator Joe Biden (Lobe, 2006). Some of these 
organizations and institutions have near-reverential status among American scholars, 
particularly among east coast liberals. They are seen as among the best supporters of 
sober, reasoned, social scientific scholarly analysis, in contrast to ‘ideologically-tainted’ 
knowledge that emerges from partisan sources, particularly from the Right’s numerous 
think tanks, scholars and policy research institutes. The PPNS, in effect, makes a claim to 
hold the centre-ground in US foreign policy, separating itself from the ‘yahoos’ of both 
left and right (Hodgson, 1972-3).  
 
Leaders’ and Collaborators’ Networks 
It follows from the above that the networks in which the Princeton Project was embedded 
did not include right wing conservative or neo-conservative groupings as sponsoring 
organizations. Representatives of think tanks and associated organizations of the 
conservative right did participate as individuals though, including William Kristol, 
Charles Krauthammer, Elliot Cohen and Frederick Kagan. The American Enterprise 
Institute, Project for the New American Century, and the Heritage Foundation were not 
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among the sponsoring bodies, however. Conversely, erstwhile staunch neo-conservative – 
now merely a conservative - Francis Fukuyama was a member of the Princeton Project’s 
13-strong Steering Committee and the Working Group on Grand Strategic Choices, 
arguably the group with the broadest remit within the Project, which he co-chaired with 
John Ikenberry (PPNS, 2006, 62). This is interesting because, despite their relative 
absence as an organised force, the neo-conservatives’ views and approaches are apparent 
within the Princeton Project’s work and Final Report, indicating that so-called neo-con 
ideas – which were always a fusion of conservative nationalism and liberal 
internationalism – are alive and well.  
 
PPNS Leaders 
A detailed analysis of the links of the 16 leaders of the PPNS – i.e., the executive 
director, the two co-chairs and 13 members of the steering committee – shows how 
closely connected with the liberal internationalist east coast establishment is the PPNS, 
specifically showing their close links with the ivy league universities, Council on Foreign 
Relations, and the foreign policy agencies of the American state (mainly pre-Bush II era). 
This evidence, while not unexpected, is important because it boosts the Gramscian 
argument that PPNS represents a group of organic intellectuals who will tend to see the 
problems of state and society from the perspectives of the dominant elites and institutions 
that sustain them. The above institutions are, as Robert Brym argues, vital agencies of 
socialization that nurture intellectuals, develop their modes of thought and, importantly, 
provide the bases of their successful integration into elite institutions. Intellectuals not so 
institutionally-integrated, it is argued, are much more likely to exhibit radical and critical 
thought and action (Brym, 1980, 19-21). Although casting themselves as ‘outsiders’ – 
people whose voices are unheard in the White House – the evidence suggests that the 
PPNS’ leaders are completely immersed in policy-organisations that reside very close to 
the centres of American elite power. As this paper argues below, PPNS cannot sustain a 
claim to be a genuine alternative – a counter-hegemonic force – as its orientations and 
outlook are so close to those of private elite and statist forces, and even share the 
underlying view of the Bush administration that American values are universal and that 
they should be exported to the rest of the world.   
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PPNS’ directors were almost all educated in prestigious ‘Ivy League’ universities: the 16 
leaders cited 14 such connections, with Harvard the most popular (7), followed by 
Princeton (4) and Cornell (3). There were a further 12 alumni links with other prestigious 
universities, including Stanford, Berkeley, Johns Hopkins, and Georgetown. Four alumni 
connections with Oxford (3) and Cambridge (1) universities were also found. As one 
would expect, the leadership group of the PPNS represents a narrow elite, educated at 
some of the foremost institutions in the United States and abroad. 
 
The 16-strong leadership group was dominated in terms of occupation by academia, with 
18 connections reported in total. Of those, 15 were posts at US universities, and 3 
overseas (Geneva, Ottawa, Oxford). Of the US university posts, 8 were at ivy league 
institutions with 5 at Princeton and 2 at Harvard. As is clear, PPNS leaders’ education 
and training at elite educational institutions prepared them, at least in part, for future roles 
as leaders of those very institutions and for the creative continuation and development of 
their functions in the overall elite power structure.    
 
Conversely, there were strong connections between the leaders and the American state, 
particularly with its security and foreign policy agencies and departments. The revolving 
door between academia and Washington, DC, including the White House, is fully 
displayed by the evidence on these leaders’ backgrounds. While 4 PPNS leaders 
indicated no direct links with state agencies, 12 reported 24 such connections, with the 
State Department accounting for 8 (33%) including two with the policy planning staff – 
Fukuyama and Ikenberry. Additionally, there were two former members of the National 
Security Council, including Harvard’s Joseph Nye.13 What this signifies – for the PPNS 
leaders’ group – is that they were, in their own terms, dedicated to ‘public service’, i.e., 
service to the state, in its various forms. In this, they follow and perpetuate a long-
established east coast elite tradition of seeing the problems of the state as if they were 
their own, placing themselves in the shoes of those in positions of state power and trying 
to arrive at creative ideas, analyses and diagnoses of the sources of state crises, and to 
develop workable solutions to those crises (Eisenach, 1994). This is the legacy of the 
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progressive tradition of a century ago, elite groups that fervently believe that they are the 
state, as Gramsci argued about such groups (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971, 146). They 
are, therefore, duty-bound to act when they perceive that extant state leaders – such as 
George W. Bush, his ‘neo-conservative’ and evangelical Christian allies – have failed 
signally to address state crises or have brought American power into disrepute. 
 
Thoroughly immersed in the health of the state, PPNS may be expected to be utterly 
saturated in the ‘epistemic communities’, ‘advocacy coalitions’ and so forth that further 
bind, coordinate and cohere the east coast foreign policy establishment. Twenty-eight 
connections were reported with a range of mainly liberal think tanks and policy research 
institutes. The largest single organisation with which the PPNS leaders are connected is 
the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an institution that sits at the very heart of the 
east coast foreign policy Establishment. It is the publisher of the influential quarterly 
review, Foreign Affairs, a journal in which many of the PPNS’ leaders have published 
articles over recent years (Shoup and Minter, 1977; Parmar, 2004). The liberal New 
America Foundation (3), Brookings Institution (2), Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (CEIP), and the Trilateral Commission were also connected with 
PPNS leaders.  Joseph Nye sits on the editorial board of Foreign Policy, the CEIP’s 
influential magazine. There were just two links with conservative groupings, one of them 
historic and recently repudiated, i.e., Fukuyama’s connections with the Project for a New 
American Century’s Statement of Principles and letter to President Bill Clinton to invade 
Iraq in the late 1990s (Parmar, 2005; Fukuyama, 2006).14 The other conservative body 
connected with PPNS is the Hoover Institution, at which Todd Lindberg is research 
fellow. Hoover, of course, is also currently home to George Shultz, Reagan’s secretary of 
state and co-chair of PPNS. The Hoover Institution is based at Stanford University, of 
which Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, was provost.  
 
It is clear that PPNS’ leadership represents the liberal-internationalist elements of the east 
coast foreign policy establishment. They are soaked in a set of mutually-reinforcing elite 
educational experiences, institutional and personal networks, and liberal sub-cultures. 
The networks of which PPNS is part are bounded by a belief – expressed in particular 
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rhetorical forms and styles of speech - in moderation, centrism, cooperation with 
reasonable people, and rationality. Each of those beliefs, however, requires some 
unpacking. They are not ‘objective’ but represent a set of values shared among a specific 
group.  This alone would cast some shadows over the scholarly and academic claims of 
the organisation – that their findings are sourced in ‘rigorous’ social science and 
historical analysis and, therefore, objectively derived, as opposed to the partial, 
ideological character of the policies of the Bush administration.   
 
PPNS Participants 
Some 398 individuals are listed in the PPNS’ final report as having participated in the 
Project since May 2004. Alongside each name appears an affiliation – usually one but 
sometimes two – that represents that person’s qualification for participation. Before 
setting out the main results of that analysis, it is worth listing a few notable participants: 
Henry Kissinger (President Nixon’s National Security adviser and secretary of state), 
Zbigniew Brzezinski (President Carter’s National Security adviser), Stephen Krasner 
(currently head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff), Richard Haass (former 
head of Policy Planning Staff in the State Department in the Bush administration, and 
currently president of the CFR), and Fareed Zakaria (editor, Newsweek International). 
Prominent scholars include John Mearsheimer (Chicago), John Lewis Gaddis (Yale) , 
Graham T. Allison (Harvard), Walter Dean Burnham (Texas) and Stephen Walt 
(Harvard). William Kristol (editor, Weekly Standard), Charles Krauthammer 
(Washington Post), Robert Kagan (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) and 
Barry Rubin (Interdisciplinary Centre, Israel, and Middle East Review of International 
Affairs) represented their respective neo-conservative viewpoints in the Project’s various 
consultations and conferences. Contributors from the ‘left’ of the academic-political 
spectrum included Bruce Cumings (Chicago), Emily Rosenberg (Macalaster), Tony Judt 
(NYU), and Ian Roxborough (SUNY).  
 
In all, 188 of the 398 participants are academics: 68 at Ivy League universities, 
principally from Princeton (42), Harvard (11), Yale (5), Columbia (4) and Brown (3). 
Eighty-seven teach and research at other elite institutions. Interestingly, there were 32 
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participants from within the American armed services’ educational and training 
institutions: 21 were from the National Defense University; 3 from the National War 
College; 2 from each of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, US Naval War 
College, and US Military Academy; and 2 from the Joint Forces Staff College.15 While 
this is not entirely unexpected – given the national security strategy that PPNS sought to 
develop – it is also instructive as to the PPNS’ character as a broadly state-oriented 
programme seeking to develop a realistic and workable ‘alternative’ to Bush’s security 
agenda. This evidence of the military’s direct participation further undermines the claims 
to objectivity that are advanced to differentiate the PPNS’ methods and approach from 
those of the ideologically-charged Bush agenda. 
 
Adding to the 32 connections of Project participants with US military colleges and 
institutes, there were 15 serving or retired officers from the Army (8), Air Force (5) and 
Navy (2). In addition, there were a further 15 connections with other agencies of the state, 
including the State Department (7), the National Security Council (1), and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (1). Other elements of the state represented included Congress, the 
Federal Reserve Board, and the Government Accountability Office. In total, there were 
62 state officials involved in the PPNS. 
 
Given the advocacy character of PPNS, it is unsurprising to find numerous connections 
with the world of foreign policy (and other) think tanks. Of the 76 links with think tanks, 
16 were with the Council on Foreign Relations – the single most popular organization 
among participants. Next in line is the liberal Brookings Institution (10), followed by the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (8), with the CEIP and New America 
Foundation (each with 6 links). Among the conservative groupings, there are 7 links with 
Hoover Institution, two each with Hudson Institute and the Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, and one link each with Cato and the American Enterprise Institute. 
 
PPNS is connected with numerous agencies of the American and foreign mass media, 
including the New York Times, Washington Post, Washington Times, and Los Angeles 
Times newspapers; Newsweek; Weekly Standard; New Republic; National Interest; 
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American Interest; Atlantic Monthly. It is also linked through participants with Foreign 
Affairs, Policy Review and the New Yorker. Finally, PPNS had one participant from Al-
Hayat, a leading pan-Arab newspaper owned by the Saudi Prince Khalid bin Sultan. The 
latter is generally pro-Western. Linkages with the press and other media – such as CNN – 
are obviously important in gauging public sentiment – American and foreign – as well as 
engaging with it in the domestic battle for hearts and minds. In those regards,  the Pew 
Research Center’s representative at Project consultations, Nicole Speulda, may have been 
useful. 
 
Finally, PPNS was connected with 32 foreign participants through several conferences. 
The list includes Lawrence Freedman (War Studies, King’s College, London, who has 
worked with Prime Minister Tony Blair’s office in developing the latter’s ‘doctrine of 
international community’; Kampfner, 2003, 10),16 Robert Cooper (Tony Blair’s former 
foreign affairs adviser and author of The Breaking of Nations), and Professor Paul 
Wilkinson (Terrorism and Political Violence Centre, St Andrews University, UK).    
 
The Project’s 398 participants operated, in effect, partly to reinforce the essential liberal-
internationalist character of its leadership group and to open some space for critiques 
from out-and-out (conservative) realists such as Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer and 
neo-conservative ‘Wilsonian-realists’ such as Kristol, Krauthammer and Kagan. There is 
no doubt whatever that PPNS is an Establishment project to ‘replace’ the Bush agenda 
with something more effective and more palatable to the leadership groups within both 
main parties given the current crisis in Iraq. Its overall conservatism underlines the words 
of the leading neo-conservative, William Kristol: the impact of the neo-conservatives has 
been such that there is no going back to isolationism, to drift away from democracy 
promotion or Iraq: ‘No one seriously thinks we don’t have to act decisively in the face of 
the threats of terror, weapons of mass destruction, radical Islam, and dictatorship and 
extremism in the Middle East…. we have to be serious… about regime change and the 
promotion of liberal democracy…’ (Kristol, 2004, 75-76).17 That is, even if the PPNS is 
evidence of a galvanization of centrist forces in the American foreign policy 
establishment, the Right has shifted the centre itself further rightward, part of a 
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conservative ascendancy from the Reagan era. Indeed, it appears from the PPNS’ Report 
that their principal claim is that they can do a lot better than Bush and the 
neoconservatives in securing America, fighting criminal-terrorism, promoting democracy 
and so on, despite retaining the underlying values and assumptions of the Bush 
administration, which is, in itself, strong evidence of a ‘conservative revolution’.   
 
Funding 
The funding of a project may be instructive as to the underlying character of the project 
and the interests that its research results may intend to promote. It also suggests the 
nature of the funders’ priorities, lines of enquiry and research that are favoured, and 
institutions and individuals that are considered worthy of receiving financial support. 
Funding flows also generate new and strengthen existing networks in the areas of 
knowledge production, dissemination and mobilization by political and state leaders, or 
by state-oriented opposition parties waiting in the wings until the crises of the incumbent 
party demand ‘new’ solutions. Some projects are funded as they seek to build and 
crystallize consensus and coherence in a field of action characterized by disagreement 
and lack of structure and direction.   
 
Funding for PPNS was derived from Princeton University, David M. Rubenstein of the 
Carlyle investment group, the Ford Foundation, as well as some for specific events from 
the New America Foundation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the 
German Marshall Fund of the United States. The Ford Foundation – a major resource for 
scholars especially in the social sciences – is renowned for its liberal internationalism, 
place at the heart of the east coast US establishment, and close ties to Washington, DC. 
Ford contributed $240,000 to PPNS and made available for participation in the Project 
one of its experienced programme officers, Bonnie D. Jenkins. Her profile is a very good 
illustration of the place of the Ford Foundation in the US power structure: prior to joining 
Ford as programme officer for US Foreign and Security Policy, Jenkins had been in 
government service for 16 years (State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, US Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, and general counsel to the 9-11 commission and 
author of part of the final report), a visiting fellow at the Kennedy School of Government 
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at Harvard, and adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Law Centre. She is lt. 
commander in the US Naval Reserve, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Jenkins’s doctorate was taken at the 
University of Virginia. At least in terms of education, career path, and institutional 
affiliations, Jenkins is likely to have reinforced the underlying liberal-internationalist 
underpinnings of the Princeton Project and a source of counsel from the points of view 
and broad approaches taken by servants of the state. 
 
Appropriately, the major American foundations promote Americanism in a variety of 
ways, principally through supporting the research and activities of academics, think tanks 
and other intellectuals. They owe their origins to the vast industrial fortunes of America’s 
‘robber barons’ – the Rockefellers, Carnegies and Fords – and they remain wedded to 
American elite, and global, power structures today. Their trustees remain affiliated to 
elite universities, Wall Street, and the leaders of both main political parties; they are 
thoroughly interlocked with the Council on Foreign Relations (Berman, 1983). Since the 
1980s, Ford’s leadership has become ‘transnationalised’ through the recruitment of 
overseas elites, slightly more representative of American society through the recruitment 
of minorities and women (Arnove and Pineda, n.d.). 
 
Representing the ‘American’ tradition of utilitarian knowledge, the foundations tend to 
view knowledge as an experts’ product that ought to be mobilized for use by practical 
policymakers. They finance influential networks of scholars and intellectual institutions, 
leveraging greater power from relatively small initial investments. They are rhetorically 
fiercely independent of the state but value ‘public service’ and are state-oriented in their 
mindset: they see the problems of the American state and foreign policy as their very 
own. They see themselves as the spiritual embodiment of the state (Parmar, 2006a).  
 
The foundations’ pragmatic and technocratic character forbids ideological bias: they 
claim to have no ideology. They extol, however, the virtues of Americanism: the market, 
the individual, limited government, egalitarianism, freedom, and the like. American 
power is self-evidently good and must be used to benefit the world in a variety of ways, 
 18 
including foreign aid for modernisation, capitalist globalization, support for international 
organizations, because a healthy global system is necessary for American security and 
prosperity. Ford’s support for the Princeton Project, therefore, is entirely in line with its 
own world-view. 
 
The foundations also combat opponents of Americanism – the anti-Americans. The 
German Marshall Fund of the US, a part-sponsor of the Princeton Project, provides an 
interesting case. Craig Kennedy, head of GMFUS, was a PPNS participant. Since 9-11, 
Kennedy has been strongly critical of the Bush administration’s public diplomacy which, 
he claims, has failed to address rising anti-Americanism, especially in European states, 
America’s most important allies. Kennedy argues that US public diplomacy has to 
‘support those European political leaders and intellectuals who are willing to take the 
increasingly unpopular stand of backing America’, to advertise the ‘good news’ and 
‘knock down slander’. In proposing a major new offensive against anti-Americanism and 
in favour of US foreign policy, Kennedy argued for building new networks of scholars, 
journalists, politicians, businessmen and students ‘dedicated to the cause of keeping the 
idea of the West and its ever expanding community of liberal democracies alive.’ Indeed, 
Kennedy suggests the resurrection and adaptation of the discredited CIA-front 
organization, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a Cold War initiative part-funded by the 
Ford Foundation in the 1950s and 1960s (Parmar, 2006b; Kennedy and Gedmin, 2003; 
Scott-Smith, 2002; Wilford, 2003). 
 
The foundations’ support for the Princeton Project on National Security, therefore, falls 
squarely in line with their own raison d’etre, history, and world-view of an American-
centred world system.  
 
Case Study: PPNS and Anti-Americanism 
An essential characteristic of the Princeton Project is captured by its Working Group on 
Anti-Americanism. The hard-headed and state-oriented character of PPNS is indicated by 
the types of analysis conducted by the Working Group and its conclusions.  
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Although there are a plethora of reports and analyses of anti-Americanism, one 
perspective that generally receives no attention – but is broadly and explicitly favoured 
by the Princeton Project – is that anti-Americanism is a price that is reasonably low and 
worth paying. That is, it may have few costs that cannot be borne for a relatively 
extended period of time, within which the US would have persuaded enough of the world 
– especially Europe – and the American body politic of the efficacy of its aggressive war 
on terror. Only a few voices, notably in the anti-Americanism section of the Princeton 
Project on National Security, appear even to have entertained this possibility.18 Yet, the 
evidence in support of this position is strong and worth further consideration.  
 
A paper by the PPNS’ Russell Berman (2005)19 pursues the line that ‘a lack of “love” for 
the United States may not entail a significant impediment for the sober pursuit of 
American interest.’ ‘What,’ after all, he enquires, ‘are the real costs of anti-
Americanism?’ Should the US ‘entertain the possibility of internalizing these costs…. 
while continuing, unrepentantly, the pursuit of unrevised policies… [that]… emerge 
presumably from core US interests and values.’ Berman then considers the impact of 
various nations’ and regions’ anti-Americanism on actual relations with the United 
States, including Germany, China, Latin America, and the Islamic world. In each case, 
Berman reports that high post-9-11 anti-Americanism rates did not translate in entirely or 
any anti-American policy outcomes. For example, Germany did not participate in the Iraq 
War but Chancellor Schroder did permit other types of support – such as Mediterranean 
naval patrols, chemical weapons detection units on the Kuwait border, and troops for 
Afghanistan. China’s trade with the US has not diminished, despite opposition to the Iraq 
War, and the much-feared ‘Arab street’ did not topple US-friendly governments. The 
Turkish decision not to cooperate, Berman argues, was driven by many concerns, 
including the Kurdish question, border issues with Iraq, and the domestic pressures from 
Islamic fundamentalism, not just anti-Americanism. Berman concludes that ‘fixing 
attitudinal anti-Americanism is actually not the silver bullet for American foreign policy,’ 
as ‘More positive attitudes about the United States are unlikely to change Arab 
evaluations of US support for Israel….’ On the other hand, some radical Islamicists turn 
to terrorism and paramilitary violence as a result of their anti-Americanism, receiving 
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protection from a broader sub-cultural aversion to the United States. Berman 
recommends targeted public diplomacy initiatives to address this issue as terrorist attacks 
have ‘potentially enormous effects on the US and …. conduct of its foreign policy.’20  
 
In terms of combating anti-Americanism, however, public diplomacy is more or less 
recognized as useful but not central; anti-Americanism is regarded as inevitable and, 
therefore, accepted as a bearable cost of American power. That is, as stated by Todd 
Lindberg (Hoover Institution; Princeton Project on National Security), and echoing 
President Bush’s National Security Strategy, many of the ‘causes [of anti-Americanism]  
are simply not addressable. Foremost is that the United States exercises global 
dominance, and no one in the United States will voluntarily pursue policies to undermine 
that position.’21 All that is left, as the numerous unofficial and official reports on public 
diplomacy and anti-Americanism confirm, is to act more effectively on the alleged 
misperceptions of ‘ordinary’ anti-Americans themselves, to win the so-called ‘middle 
ground’(CFR, 2003), and isolate the radical anti-Americans, to ‘persuade the peoples of 
the world of the justness of our cause’ (CFR, 2001).  
 
The Princeton Group also studied the economic effects of anti-Americanism and 
concludes that, apart from a few scattered and short-lived boycotts of US goods and the 
increased costs of security for US corporate employees overseas, there was no major 
cause for concern.22 
 
Despite the PPNS’ implicit and explicit anti-Bush perspectives, it is interesting to note 
that the former’s approach to combating anti-Americanism is fundamentally similar to 
that taken by the Bush administration. The domestic political line promoted by the 
administration responds to the media, Congress and opposition Democrats – who charge 
that the administration has drastically reduced America’s ability to build coalitions and 
attain policy goals; it also responds to a public bewildered that ‘God’s own country’ 
should be seen as a monster abroad. Within the administration, however, it is more than 
likely that the political cost-benefit analysis – along the lines argued by PPNS - has been 
conducted and a decision taken to bear the costs of anti-Americanism, on the whole. 
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There is recognition that it is US policies, not American culture per se, that are deeply 
opposed by anti-Americans; those policies, however, are unchangeable in their 
fundamentals as they express core US interests. The Defense Science Board’s report, for 
example, despite recognising the rational bases of most Middle Eastern opposition to the 
US, does not conclude that the US should change its foreign policies: only that it should 
develop better knowledge of its strategic communications’ ‘target audience’ (Department 
of Defense, 2004). Given the ideological and/or militaristic character of leading Bush 
administration members – Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice – and its closest supporters – Perle, 
Wolfowitz – such an attitude merges with a reflex predisposition to view anti-
Americanism as a foreign problem, not an American one (Abelson, 2006; Woodward, 
2004). Put simply, there are few benefits to be gained by a reduction in anti-
Americanism.  
 
This line of argument effectively helps to highlight the two logics that appear to have 
determined the Bush administration’s efforts to ‘combat’ anti-Americanism. The first 
logic is domestic opinion – media, Congress, and public – demanding action from the 
White House to curb rising hostility to the United States, the self-evidently ‘good’ 
country. The second logic, however, is the logic of viewing anti-Americanism as an 
absorbable cost, too low to matter in the world of power politics. The two logics would 
suggest the policies rolled out to combat anti-Americanism are likely to be, despite the 
fanfare, superficial, lacking consistency and coordination, unsystematic, inefficiently 
administered, and relatively cheap. They are followed largely to mollify public opinion, 
Congress, media critics, and the political opposition, rather than as a serious attempt to 
solve the problem which would require modification or abandonment of US policies. For 
the purposes of this article, the above analysis suggests that the PPNS and the Bush 
administration were not poles apart in regard to their analysis and prescriptions for 
combatting anti-Americanism. This conclusion finds a large measure of support when the 
Princeton Project’s Final Report is analysed. 
 
Analysis of the Final Report: Forging A World of Liberty Under Law. U.S. National 
Security in the 21st Century 
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Three specific aims -- securing the homeland against hostile attacks or fatal epidemics; 
building a healthy global economy, ‘which is essential for our own prosperity and 
security’; and constructing ‘a benign international environment’, grounded in security 
cooperation among nations and the spread of liberal democracy -- should constitute 
Washington's basic objectives, according to the Report. The Report was published in July 
2006, in the very middle of Bush’s second term (2004-2008), at a time when criticism of 
the US war on Iraq was commonplace – from broad swathes of public opinion to neo-
conservatives such as Francis Fukuyama and Richard Perle, Republicans such as Senator 
Charles Hagel, let alone leading Democrats such as Hilary Clinton and, later, Barack 
Obama. Disenchantment with the Bush strategy was reflected in emphatic victory for the 
Democrats at the mid-term elections of November 2006 – gaining control of both Senate 
and House of Representatives - which many predicted signalled the death of the ‘Bush 
doctrine’ of unilateralism, pre-emption, preventive war, and militarism as outlined in the 
National Security Strategy of 2002 (Hurst, 2007). 
 
The following sections of the article consider the Report’s uses of history, its attachment 
to democratic peace theory, attitude to the United Nations, and the role of global 
networks in American power.  
 
The Report’s view of ‘history’ is instructive: Pearl Harbor taught Americans ‘that the 
security of their homeland and the viability of the American way of life as a free society 
depended upon developments in the rest of the world… Simply put, we learned that 
aggressors in far away lands, if left unchecked, would some day threaten the United 
States. The implications of this lesson were profound. Rather than recoiling in isolation 
from great power politics, we decided as a nation that it was imperative to play an active 
and leading role in the world’ (PPNS, 2006, 16). That is, an innocent America was rudely 
awakened by an unprovoked military attack on its territory by a power to which it had 
done nothing, a version of US-Japanese relations in the period that may be comforting 
though not entirely accurate (Thompson, 1992).  
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The postwar ‘transformation of the Soviet Union from ally to adversary’ – how this 
happened or was engineered is not discussed - as well as the threat of economic 
depression further strengthened American resolve behind ‘global involvement in the early 
years of the Cold War’ (PPNS, 2006, 16). The uncritical assertion of the ‘Soviet threat’ as 
a key cause of America’s very neutral-sounding ‘global involvement’ is also worrying, 
given the weight of historical scholarship on the question (Leffler, 1992; Kolko, 1969; 
Shoup and Minter, 1977; Campbell, 1992). According to the Report, it was NSC-68 that 
brought together all the strands of an enduring national security strategy – ‘the seminal 
1950 memo that reorganized and reoriented our national security policy for the Cold War. 
It laid out the doctrine of containment..’ as well as stressing the necessity of building a 
‘healthy international community’ as the US ‘needed then, as we need now, a “world 
environment within which the American system can survive and flourish”’ (PPNS, 2006, 
16). That the drive to develop and sell to the American public the aggressive and 
expansionist message of NSC-68 was led by the militaristic Committee on the Present 
Danger, receives no acknowledgement in the Final Report (Sanders, 1983). 
 
Combined with such realizations – that the United States had global enemies and faced 
serious threats – and a response in terms of the containment doctrine, the Truman 
administration inaugurated an era of international institution-building to generate a 
‘benign’ international environment (PPNS, 2006, 15). The IMF, World Bank, United 
Nations, NATO, as well as the Marshall Plan that catalysed European recovery and 
integration, helped to create and maintain a state of affairs that ‘served the interests of 
many other countries, making it easier to pursue our interests as well.’ In those days, the 
‘United States led but listened, gained by giving, and emerged stronger because its global 
role was accepted as legitimate’ (PPNS, 2006, 16, 22). 
 
This is a version of history that is presented as uncontested: it is, by definition, true for 
the PPNS. It conforms to the overall view that American power is benign, largely reactive 
and defensive, and relatively enlightened, rather than narrowly-construed and self-
serving. It is to try and take from the past what is best for adaptation to the present that 
appears to animate the Report. The Truman era is then a ‘golden era’ of relative 
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prosperity, security and order, which we need, in today’s conditions, to re-invent as ‘the 
world seems a more menacing place than ever’ (PPNS, 2006, 11):  ‘it means safeguarding 
our alliances and promoting security cooperation among liberal democracies, ensuring 
the safety of Americans abroad as well as at home, avoiding the emergence of hostile 
great powers or balancing coalitions against the United States, and encouraging liberal 
democracy and responsible government worldwide’ (PPNS, 2006, 16). 
 
The Princeton Project is persuaded of the efficacy of ‘democratic peace’ theory:  
democracies do not fight each other and the best hope for the world is democratization 
(PPNS, 2006, 25). Therefore, build alliances of liberal democracies, prevent other great 
powers or coalitions threatening the US, and promote democracy. Critiques of this view 
are left unaddressed (Rosato, 2003). 
 
This sounds, of course, not dissimilar to the ‘neo-conservative’ orientations of the Bush 
administration and, of course, thinking within the Truman administration (O’Neil, 2006). 
This is understandable, according to Stephen Walt, as liberal internationalists and neo-
conservatives share a belief in the essential goodness of American power and the 
necessity of its use for global improvement.23 That is why many liberal internationalists – 
some of them involved in the Princeton Project (Joseph Nye, for example) - supported the 
Iraq War (Der Derian, 2003). Both groups also want only America and its allies to own 
and control weapons of mass destruction (Walt, 2006, 2). They differ, however, on the 
role of international institutions with neo-cons skeptical due to liberals’ stubborn desire 
for observing international law and, thereby, hindering the realization of American 
interests. It is clear though that the Princeton Project recognizes the limitations of the UN, 
for example, and calls, first, for  ‘radical surgery’ – abolition of the Security Council veto 
- to permit military interventions in sovereign states, and secondly, for a new 
organization of liberal democracies that would, in the failure of the UN to act, militarily 
enforce the UN’s ‘values’ (Walt, 2006, 7).  
 
The overlaps between the Princeton Project’s Final Report and Bush’s 2002 NSS (and the 
core beliefs of Bush’s neo-con allies) are many and interesting. Where the NSS and neo-
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cons argued for spreading democracy, the Project argues for spreading ‘Liberty under 
Law’ (Walt, 2006, 2). Where NSS wanted ‘a balance of power that favors human 
freedom’, PPNS promotes ‘maintaining a balance of power in favor of liberal 
democracies’. Both agree that defending and promoting freedom/liberal democracy 
requires ‘continued high level of U.S. defense spending…’ (PPNS, 2006, 30). NSS 
emphasized preventive war and action which PPNS endorses against ‘extreme states’ 
after approval from the UN or ‘some broadly representative multilateral body…’ (Walt, 
2006, 4). 
 
To the PPNS, the United Nations system is broken and needs reform. Barring reform, the 
United States should build a new ‘Concert of Democracies’ to enforce international law 
and deter and intervene against aggressors, brutal states, terrorist havens and so on. The 
concert of democracies would be an American-centred alliance that would feature 
military burden-sharing. In practice, the concert of democracies is likely to be an alliance 
of the US, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand and, possibly, India. It is not too far 
removed from what some have argued for over a decade now: a sort of alliance of the 
English-speaking countries – an Anglosphere (Lloyd, 2000; Hichens, 2007),24 the 
evolution of a hangover from late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century Anglo-
Saxonism: a racist belief in the innate biologically-determined superiority in economy, 
industry, government and culture of the Anglo-Saxon peoples (Anderson, 1981).   This 
reappeared as Federal Unionism in the late 1930s and early 1940s, specifically between 
the US and Britain but including its white dominions as well as Scandinavia (Parmar, 
2004, 71-2, 195-6). Its racism was underlined by the machinations among its sponsors to 
gerrymander power away from populous India in a future federal assembly – including 
techniques borrowed from the US deep south to disenfranchise African-Americans. The 
proposed concert of democracies may well follow in an updated version of this tradition. 
That is, it appears to be part of an imperial project. 
 
Empire has become in many neo-cons’ and others’ eyes perfectly acceptable today. An 
empire of liberty is not really an empire at all. An empire that promotes and extends 
democracy is the very antithesis of the old colonial system. And democracies do not fight 
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wars against other democracies. In many ways, these ideas are endorsed by the PPNS’ 
Final Report (Ikenberry, 2004).25 There is an expansive sense of ‘America’ in the Final 
Report when it argues that ‘U.S. borders [should] be defined for some purposes as 
extending to the port of shipment rather than the port of entry….[American officials 
should also]… strengthen the quality and capacity of a foreign government to control its 
territory and enforce its laws,’ a necessary corollary to ‘defining our borders beyond 
those established by land and sea’ (PPNS, 2006, 57). As Henry Kissinger is quoted as 
arguing, US foreign policy must ‘ “protect the extraordinary opportunity that has come 
about to recast the international system.”’ The Princeton Project seeks to help America to 
grasp this opportunity to lay the foundations for advancing America’s interests on every 
front, rather than just vanquishing one enemy [global terrorism]…a long-term strategy 
should strive to shape the world as we want it to be’ (PPNS, 2006, 58). As Samuel 
Huntington argued several decades ago, what there is of American empire was gained 
through territorial penetration rather than territorial acquisition: precisely the Princeton 
Project’s preferred mode of exercising power (Huntington, 1973). 
 
One of the means by which American interests are to be realized is through the power of 
global networks: ‘We should establish and institutionalize networks of national, regional, 
and local government officials and nongovernmental representatives to create numerous 
channels for [democratic] nations and others to work on common problems and to 
communicate and inculcate the values and practices that safeguard liberty under law’ 
(PPNS, 2006, 7). The aim is to intersect ‘international institutions and domestic 
governments… institutions providing incentives and pressure to help conquer 
dysfunctional levels of corruption and bolster the rule of law…’ (PPNS, 2006, 23). 
 
Despite denials, therefore, of an imperial project, the levels of global leadership, global 
military engagement, and degree of penetration of overseas nations – through border, port 
and other security cooperation and supervision, interventions through public diplomacy 
and education – and political warfare – for nipping threats abroad in the bud – all suggest 
that the PPNS effectively endorses an imperial approach to safeguarding American 
security. Kennan would, surely, have approved.26   
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An instructive quotation: ‘[A] military that is strong and ready to meet both present and 
future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American 
principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global 
responsibilities. 
‘Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we 
cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are 
associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in 
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges 
to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it 
is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they 
become dire. The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of 
American leadership.’ 
The above statement is not drawn from the PPNS’ Final Report, but it would not be out 
of place there. In fact, the quotation is extracted from the 1997 Statement of Principles of 
the Project for A New American Century. It is instructive as to the degree to which the 
‘centre’ has shifted to the Right since 1997. 
 
The Final Report of the Princeton Project has received wide attention: it was launched on 
Capitol Hill by Charles Hagel and now Vice-President-elect, Joseph Biden, and presented 
to conferences across the USA normally co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign 
Relations, at private meetings between Ikenberry, Slaughter and Senate staffers. There 
were plans to lobby congressmen to organise ‘Princeton Project events in their home 
districts’, a visit to the UN to discuss the Report, and events in China and Europe 
(Quinones, 2006). 
 
PPNS is an ‘alternative’ within a new consensus on US engagement with the world and 
its re-making post-1989 and post-9/11; this is a re-ordering of the world more specifically 
under a US- led global system requiring the redefinition of roles of global institutions , 
alliances and so on. This process, triggered after 1989, and ongoing since the 1990s, and 
especially after 9/11 includes developments under Bush as well as Tony Blair’s thinking 
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on ‘international community’: i.e., it stands rhetorically as ‘alternative’ to Bush in theory 
but in practice able to go along; it is liberal imperial at its core.27 
 
The PPNS Report’s recommendations are an integral part of the liberal imperial project, 
not its rejection. It had to be this way due to the objectives of the Project, its leadership 
and participants, and the scholar-activists’ desire to be taken seriously by policymakers, 
affecting its design, leadership, membership, funding and networks. It was oriented to the 
US state and therefore had to enter its intellectual frameworks and underpinnings if it was 
to sound ‘realistic’ as an ‘alternative’ to the state or an opposition party in waiting.28 
 
The PPNS is therefore an example of scholarship in the service of the state – state 
intellectuals, organic intellectuals, behind an imperial programme that is undemocratic as 
it is centred upon US preponderance; socially and economically unjust to the third world 
through its attachment to ‘the generally beneficial process of globalization’ (PPNS, 2006, 
7), has disturbing racist undertones through its championing of a ‘concert of liberal 
democracies’, militaristic in terms of its attempt to internationalise the burdens of the 
American world project, and imperialistic due to its recommendations for global 
penetration via network-building, state-building and social engineering.29 
 
Obama, McCain and post-Bush foreign policy 
Several key Princeton Project participants, and associates of allied liberal groupings such 
as Brookings and the Council on Foreign Relations, were connected with Obama’s 
campaign for the presidency. Conversely, Republican John McCain’s foreign policy 
advisers were, unsurprisingly, drawn largely from the ranks of conservatives and neo-
conservatives. Despite this, there are a significant number of overlaps and 
interconnections between Obama’s and McCain’s foreign policy advisers, reflecting the 
influence of the new consensus. Below is a brief analysis of the likely foreign policy 
orientations of an Obama or, had he won the November 2008 elections, McCain White 
House, based mainly on their known policy positions and foreign policy advisers.30 It 
suggests that there is likely to be continuity with Bush in US foreign and national security 
policy under the Obama administration. 
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President-elect Barack Obama has raised the hope of a different kind of America in world 
affairs, in contrast to the Bush presidency’s aggressive and unilateral approach. Eloquent, 
educated (he has a degree in politics and international relations, after all), and 
sophisticated, his rhetoric is reminiscent of several great US presidents: Abraham 
Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy. He sounds reasonable, moderate, 
measured, and realistic, not unlike the Final Report of the Princeton Project. 
 
This is not the place to rake over Obama’s speeches beyond noting a few points: his 
opposition to the Iraq War, in the autumn of 2002, when he was not a US senator and 
therefore not under the kinds of political and social pressures to which such incumbents 
are subject, was that it was a ‘dumb war’ with no clear rationale or international 
coalition.31 Had it been an ‘intelligent’ war, Obama presumably would have supported it. 
It was not opposition based on the illegality of the war, or the sovereign rights of nations,  
nor against war in principle. This point is significant as Obama later came to support the 
war effort as America ‘fighting for freedom in an increasingly dangerous world’ and as a 
war ‘to protect us [USA]’.32 By late 2005, the principal problem of the Iraq War, for 
Obama, was that it had increased isolationist sentiment in the United States, which the 
country ‘cannot afford’. Since then, Obama has increasingly hardened his position on 
Iraq to the point that he differs little in practice from John McCain: withdrawal only 
when conditions are right, whenever that might be: ‘we must be as careful getting out of 
Iraq as we were careless getting in,’ he noted in July 2008.33 
 
Obama’s broad approach to America in the world is summarised in a quotation from a 
speech in April 2007 to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs: ‘I reject the notion that 
the American moment has passed. I dismiss the cynics who say that this new century 
cannot be another when… we lead the world in battling immediate evils and promoting 
the ultimate good…. I still believe that America is the last, best hope of Earth. We just 
have to show the world how this is so….’34  
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In summary form, Obama’s foreign policy positions follow along well-worn lines: global 
interdependence; a twenty-first century American military capable of combatting 
multiple threats; eliminating enemy states’ weapons of mass destruction; reforming the 
United Nations, NATO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund; integrating 
China; and so on. 
 
The continuities with the past are further suggested by recent reports that President 
Obama favours President Bush’s secretary of defence, Robert Gates, to continue in the 
role. This is backed by Obama’s close foreign policy adviser, Richard Danzig, (who was 
Bill Clinton’s secretary of the navy). According to the (London) Sunday Times, Gates 
‘has been quietly seeking an orderly transition to a new US administration in January 
[2009] so that hard-won military gains in Iraq are not thrown away in a hasty 
withdrawal.’ In addition, Gates has emphasised the need to ‘negotiate’ with Iran over its 
nuclear programmes. Another possible contender for the defence portfolio is Republican 
Senator Chuck Hagel, a Bush critic who launched the Princeton Project’s Final Report in 
2006 (Baxter, 2008).35  
 
What of Obama’s other foreign policy advisers? They include Tony Lake, Bill Clinton’s 
national security adviser and co-chair of the Princeton Project, and Ivo Daalder 
(Brookings Institution), member of Bill Clinton’s national security council. Daalder was 
also associated with the Princeton Project and, in particular, is a champion of the ‘concert 
of democracies’: in a brief co-written piece with neo-conservative Robert Kagan (another 
Princeton Project participant), Daalder argued that the Concert would decide on military 
interventions around the world although the final arbiter would always be the United 
States (Daalder and Kagan, 2007; Daalder and Lindsay, 2006).36 An early supporter of 
the Iraq War, Daalder has also been signatory to a number of PNAC letters to President 
Bush, since 2003. Other advisers include Zbigniew Brzezinski (President Carter’s 
national security adviser, and Trilateral Commission leader and CFR member), Lawrence 
Korb (President Reagan’s assistant secretary of defence, and the CFR’s director of 
national security studies), and Susan Rice (President Clinton’s assistant secretary of state, 
and CFR member). Susan Rice, in 2005, endorsed secretary of state Condoleeza Rice’s 
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view that the ‘goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed 
states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the 
international system.’ In addition, Susan Rice endorsed Secretary Rice’s view that ‘weak 
and failing states serve as global pathways’ to terrorism, crime and disease: the only 
difference was that Susan rejected Condoleeza’s way of tackling the problem.37 Until 
recently, Harvard’s Samantha Power was also an Obama adviser: Power’s humanitarian 
interventionism is undergirded by a powerful belief that ‘security is our [Obama’s and 
Power’s] first, second, third, and fourth priority’.38 In total, of Obama’s original twenty-
three foreign policy advisers, at least fifteen had held a post in President Clinton’s 
administration, ten of them in his national security council. More recently, Obama 
convened a ‘national security working group’ that included Clinton’s secretaries of state, 
Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright, his secretary of defense, William Perry, his 
assistant secretary of state, Susan Rice, Clinton’s secretary of the navy, Richard Danzig, 
conservative Democrat, former senator Sam Nunn, Clinton’s national security adviser, 
Tony Lake, and former congressman Lee Hamilton.39 Obama’s appointment of the pro-
Iraq War Senator Joseph Biden as his vice-presidential running mate further emphasised 
the strong likelihood of continuity in US foreign policy after November 2008.  The 
additional interesting point here is that Clinton’s Pentagon advisers had given a warmer 
welcome to an early draft of the hawkish PNAC’s Rebuilding America’s Defenses 
document, than had the Bush team (Abelson, 2006, 215-6). 
 
John McCain, of course, made hardly any claims to alter the course of Bush’s foreign 
policies. He supported the Iraq War from the very beginning, including at the height of its 
unpopularity at the end of 2006. He supported the military ‘surge’ policy of 2007 too. He 
is on record as suggesting that United States military forces would remain in Iraq for as 
long as it takes. He has even reversed his opposition to American torture, such as 
‘waterboarding’. He refers to himself as a ‘Goldwater Republican’, a conservative 
nationalist not unlike President George W. Bush (Parmar, 2005).40 Interestingly, McCain 
has recently become a champion of a ‘ “League of Democracies” to advance our values 
and defend our shared interests.’41 Though few details of how the league might work 
have been divulged, the idea receives some attention in Robert Kagan’s recent book, The 
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Return of History and the End of Dreams.42 The league of democracies clearly resonates 
with the Clinton era (when Tony Lake was his national security adviser and author of the 
‘democratic enlargement’ policy concept) ‘community of democracies’ and with the 
Princeton Project’s more recent ‘concert of democracies’. Clearly, Kagan worked with 
Ivo Daalder to develop the concept for the McCain campaign team. For McCain, the 
League of Democracies would be ‘convened and led by the United States’ and would act 
every time the United Nations failed to do so. McCain wants to promote democracy 
because it enhances US security (Loconte, 2008). More critically, Thomas Carothers 
suggests that the League/Concert of democracies promoted by McCain and the Princeton 
Project is an American vehicle for ‘gaining international approval for American 
interventions abroad’. While Ikenberry and Slaughter see a relatively limited role for the 
Concert, McCain envisages a ‘global compact’ for putting pressure on autocratic regimes 
like China and Russia, ‘imposing sanctions on Iran,’ and so on. The lack of international 
consultation about the League/Concert also suggests that ‘it embodies the same instincts 
that lie behind the made-to-order multilateralism that the world has grown so tired of 
under George W. Bush.’ Hardliners like Charles Krauthammer claim that the best thing 
about a League/Concert is that it’s ‘hidden agenda….is to essentially kill the U.N’ 
(Carothers, 2008). 
 
Alongside Robert Kagan, McCain’s foreign policy advisers, again unsurprisingly, 
included an impressive array of conservatives and neo-conservatives, including: Randy 
Scheunemann, a former adviser to secretary of defense Rumsfeld, president of the 
Committee for the Liberation of Iraq (CLI), and PNAC board member; Gary Schmitt, 
PNAC executive committee member, and secretary of CLI; James Woolsey, President 
Clinton’s CIA director, PNAC member, and patron of the Henry Jackson Society; 
William Kristol, editor of the neo-conservative Weekly Standard; George Schultz, 
Reagan’s secretary of state, Hoover Institution and American Enterprise Institute fellow, 
CLI member, and co-chair of the Princeton Project on National Security; and finally, 
Niall Ferguson, British champion of American empire (Ferguson, 2005). 
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Again, although both presidential candidates’ foreign policy advisers tended to be drawn 
from different think tanks and traditions, it is also striking that there are overlaps. Among 
Obama’s original twenty-three foreign policy advisers and McCain’s twenty-five, there 
are at least thirty-six linkages through various think tanks such as the Council on Foreign 
Relations (8), PNAC/CLI (9), Princeton Project on National Security (9), and the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (3). Obama has five advisory linkages with 
Brookings (McCain has none), while McCain has two such connections with Hoover 
(Obama has none). This further indicates the relatively restricted and incestuous 
intellectual and policy worlds from which the two main presidential contenders drew 
their advisors, and how implicated they are in the new conservative-liberal consensus.  
 
CONCLUSION 
It is often argued that the neo-cons ‘hijacked’ the Bush administration – particularly 
through the influence of the PNAC. It is clear, however, that there was no ‘hijacking’ by 
neo-cons of the Bush administration. As Mickelthwait and Wooldridge argue in The 
Right Nation, what the neo-cons were saying for so long struck a chord with conservative 
America only after 9-11; the neo-cons’ outlook captured and articulated the 
conservatives’ mood – within the Bush administration and the country – and made it 
appear that the neo-cons were in control, that there was a ‘neo-conservative moment’. In 
practice, it may well have been that the neo-cons were more servants than masters of the 
Bush administration.43 The American state – the conservative Establishment as 
represented by the Bush administration – may have used them much more than it was 
used by them. 
 
It is clear that the Cons/neocons and PPNS liberals have structural sources that set them 
apart and also have discernably differing emphases in terms of US foreign policy and 
national security. They belong in the main to different parties and think tanks and they 
tend to be funded by different organisations/foundations. Their rhetoric also differs in 
terms of stridency, morality and uses of religious references. However, core, leading 
elements from each grouping overlap in membership of common organisations – such as 
the CFR, for example. Their politics and actual policy preferences are neither mutually 
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exclusive nor contradictory but dovetail well and complement one another. They are two 
sides of the same coin. Their differences are tactical and timing related, not fundamental 
oppositions. Even the Iraq war, for example, illustrates this: many conservatives and 
liberals supported the war, many critiqued it from start. But the character of the critiques 
was related to effectiveness of war against Iraq for US foreign policy, image and 
influence, efficacy of the Iraq war in the war on terror, and so on, not on fundamental 
premises about the right of nations to self determination and the fundamentals of 
international law. Indeed, it is on the Iraq War since its beginning that the underlying 
consensus is further underlined. While opinion was initially divided as to the precise role 
of the Iraq War in the global war on terrorism – some called it a diversion, others 
disagreed – it is now united and cohesive: Iraq is now the de facto front-line in the war on 
terror. Bush and Al Qaeda have successfully made it so. And Obama has to contend with 
that regardless of his initial ‘opposition’ to the war, because liberals and conservatives 
agree on the need to wage a ‘long war’ against terrorism. Indeed, Obama’s desire to 
‘draw-down’ troop levels in Iraq is advocated precisely because the underlying consensus 
on the war on terror still holds: President Obama just wants to focus much more on 
Afghanistan (and Pakistan). 
 
From differing politics and ‘ideologies’, in practice PPNS and the conservatives, after 9-
11, have ended up in similar positions. PPNS represents an institutional expression of that 
fusion. Its proceedings and publications suggest that US foreign policy of President 
Obama will not differ greatly from that pursued by George W. Bush: that is, it is likely to 
remain imperial in approach. 
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16
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17
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24
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positively: see the Wall Street Journal, 3 February 2007. 
25
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26
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27
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Bromley, American Power and the Prospects for International Order  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). 
28
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York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p.5.  
29
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Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books, 2005), p.xix.  
30
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32
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33
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40
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41
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